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the general inaction of the American bar has been commented upon. Phillip
L. Graham, publisher of the Washington Post, stated in a public address that
the legal profession had failed to meet its obligation to support individual
freedom and act as "America's ministers of justice." He said that "By and
large, the attitudes of the bar have indicated silent acquiesence in, and even
occasionally affirmative support for, innovations affecting personal freedom
that would have raised the collective hairs of this association straight on end
not many years ago."2
The bar has always had two historical roles to choose between: the in-
difference to civil freedoms which led to wholesale distrust of layers during
the American Revolution, the Jacksonian period and the latter part of the
19th century; or the defense of individual liberty which marked the John
Peter Zenger sedition trial in 1735,3 the New York City Bar Association's
opposition to the Lusk Committee in the 1920's 4 and the 1947 Letter to
President Truman from twenty-two faculty members of the Yale Law School
protesting the promulgation of the loyalty order.0
As Professor Commager phrased it, "Each generation has to vindicate these
freedoms anew, and for itself." Four members of our profession have reported
the ragged status of our freedoms, and it is now up to the bar as a whole to
lead the march to the mending shop.
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UNTIL recently, the effects of taxation on personal initiative and corporate
decisions have been largely matters for speculation. Some writers have con-
sistently predicted dire consequences to the economy from any hoisting of
tax rates. Others have asserted that tax changes would not have significant
2. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1951, p. 8, col 8.
3. 17 How. St Tr. 675 (1735).
4. Statement of Special Committee of Association of Bar of City of New York,
Reports, Vol 21, 1920. The statement was directed to the legislature of the state of New
York and was signed by Charles Evans Hughes, Morgan J. O'Brien, Louis Marshall,
Joseph M1. Proskauer and Ogden L. Mills.
5. N.Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 27, 1947, p. 1, col. 6.
tiMember of the District of Columbia Bar.
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effects. Still others faced the issue squarely and admitted that, while theoreti-
cally there was much to be said on both sides, actually no one had ever made
a factual analysis of the effects of taxation on business.
At long last, under the aegis of the Harvard Graduate School of Business
Administration, a group of well-qualified economics and business professors
is making a thorough inquiry into the effects of taxation on various aspects
of the economy. The Harvard inquiry is broken down into separate studies
which deal with tax effects in specific areas. These two books, part of the
series, represent an appraisal of the effects of taxes on management incentive.
Generally speaking, there are two broad kinds of "incentive" which taxes
may be assumed to affect in some degree. One is the motive to invest in new
or expanded enterprises--either on the part of corporations or of individual
investors. The other is the desire to put forward greater or less individual
effort. While they are somewhat interwined, each may be delineated in some
situations. Thus, in the case of a single small entrepreneur, it is often difficult
to distinguish the motive to invest from the motive to exert greater or less
personal effort. But the propensity of a large national corporation to invest
is rather clearly a thing apart from the inclination of its officers to work
more or less hard at their jobs. It is with the latter, the individual incentive,
that Professors Hall and Sanders are almost exclusively concerned.
Professor Hall's study of tax effects on executive compensation and retire-
ment plans is an intensive analysis of one aspect of the broader field surveyed
by Professor Sanders. Together they attempt to analyze the effects of taxation
on management incentive. Even in its broadest sense this is but a small aspect
of the incentive problem as a whole. But the field of "management incentive"
is narrowed considerably by the Hall-Sanders definition. While they give
cursory recognition to the little executive in the big corporation and to the
big executive in the little corporation, the bulk of their research is devoted
to the big executive in the big corporation-chairmen of the board, presidents
and vice-presidents of giant national enterprises. Thus the light these two
books shed on the hotly-debated question of what high taxes are doing to
the American System of Free Enterprise is faint at best.
Within their narrow sphere, however, the conclusions of the two books
are illuminating. Both indicate that higher taxes have led to considerably less
direct reduction of effort than the prophets of doom predicted. Sanders and
Hall both rely to a great extent on the results of personal interviews. In such
a subjective area as that of establishing individual reactions, probably no other
technique is feasible. Sanders, in fact, asserts that any attempt at statistical
compilations concerning executive behavior would be more misleading than
useful. The authors thus confine themselves largely to reporting the results
of their interviews and trying to discern general trends in the responses they
received.
Professor Sanders concludes that a whole host of non-financial incentives
operate to minimize any slow-down effects of increased taxation. He finds
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that both increased government controls and growing difficulties in dealing
with labor unions are far greater disincentives to many executives than is the
reduction of income by increased taxes. But even "all these disincentives added
together... are not sufficient to quell adventurous and vigorous spirits. What
all history goes to show is again confirmed by a good deal of the evidence in
this study, that difficulty, danger, and strenuous effort are themselves in-
centives to many men."1
In many respects Professor Hall's findings corroborate these conclusions.
He too found that most executives feel that high personal income taxation
has not reduced their efforts. However, he indulges in some fanciful reason-
ing to isolate certain indirect effects of higher taxes which he believes are
deleterious to the economy. Thus he asserts that deferred compensation plans,2
whose growth has been stimulated by increased taxation, tend to reduce the
total output of goods and services. This results, says Professor Hall, primarily
because they reduce executive mobility. This immobilizing effect is produced be-
cause many plans involve partial or complete forfeiture of accrued deferred pay-
ments if employment is terminated. Of course, these same plans have other
consequences (e.g., possible increased efficiency resulting from prompt retire-
ments and the encouragement of promotions from within the organization)
which might well counteract any unhappy effects of reduced mobility. Pro-
fessor Hall recognizes these, weighs them, and concludes that they only par-
tially offset the stratifying influence of such plans in their effect on the
economy. On the other hand, a similar analysis leads him to conclude that
most retirement and profit-sharing plans increase the output of goods and
services. Here increased efficiency due to profit participation and prompt
retirement overcomes the effects of decreased mobility.
On the whole, Professor Sanders' book is more concerned with the direct
effects of taxation on incentive. He reports the results of his interviews with
little theoretical embellishment, simply recording how executives feel about
such things as their day-to-day jobs and their own and their colleagues'
mobility under increased taxation. One small section of the book even dis-
cusses how executives, in their personal investments, are reacting to higher
taxes. Throughout the book, Professor Sanders' light and human approach
saves the straightforward narration from becoming dull reading.
Professor Hall's work is probably of necessity a more speculative and
theoretical project. And its inherent complexities virtually guarantee that the
reading will not be easy. Certainly the exposition of the nature, growth, and
tax treatment of the various kinds of executive compensation and retire-
ment plans is as factual and plain-spoken as the discussion of such a compli-
1. SAxDERS, p. 14.
2. This term refers to "a special form of deferred-type compensation plan which
provides definitely determinable periodic deferred payments to one employee, vAth the
employer company making the payments directly to the participant." HALL, p. 6 n. 3.
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cated subject can be. But Professor Hall frequently leaves the realm of
reasonably verifiable fact to indulge in speculation about the indirect effects
on the economy of the various types of plans. This seems hardly justifiable in
a book which forms part of a survey whose basic objective is fact-finding. His
field is difficult enough. Beclouding the reader's comprehension with a host
of dubious inferences seems unwarranted.
These two books, narrow in their scope and, at best, tentative in their con-
clusions, evidence a healthy trend. All signs portend that high taxes will per-
sist. By putting the discussion of their incentive effects on a factual, as opposed
to an emotional, basis, Sanders and Hall have stimulated a more rational ap-
proach to the whole problem of taxation and the American Economy.
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